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27 March 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEREVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 114/2

1. The President has requested that NSC 114/2 be brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 114/2 and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intelligence.

2. The attached draft has been prepared through the cooperation of representatives of the IAC and is hereby submitted for approval of the IAC. It will be considered at the meeting on 3 April.

James Q. Reber
Secretary



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IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952

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IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952Draft Annex No. 6FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)Foreign Intelligence

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must increase its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased success in this regard. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent in considerable measure upon other factors such as the refinement of our collection targets, the effectiveness of the collection effort, the skill with which sources are exploited and information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. Expansion is nevertheless essential in the intelligence agencies of the State and Military departments, if the intelligence community is to be adequately prepared for the period of greatest danger ahead, for the increased demands for intelligence service created in large part by the programs set forth elsewhere in this paper, and for the inevitable intelligence build-up which would be required in

TOP SECRET
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952**TOP SECRET**

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Security Information
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952

the event of a spread of hostilities. While the increased funds necessary to support this expansion are negligible in relation to the entire program, they have not in fact been allocated, and in general it may be said that the departmental intelligence agencies find themselves with no greater resources in personnel and logistic support than they possessed in 1950.

2. The improvement of U. S. foreign intelligence is an important objective and one closely related to the policies recommended here since our estimates of foreign intentions and capabilities bearing on the East-West struggle are directly dependent upon the effectiveness of our intelligence organization. To improve the over-all value of their product, the intelligence agencies must focus upon these essentials:

First, they must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and others which confront the National Security Council.

Second, both the collection and research activities of the several intelligence agencies must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952~~TOP SECRET~~

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Security Information
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952

of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in focusing the attention of the intelligence community on these continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Estimates, and of reaching agreement on the coordination of various other intelligence activities.

4. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for strengthening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Orbit countries, have made renewed efforts to exploit available overt information. In spite of some success, however, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts opportunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations. The resources and possibilities available for covert collection are therefore and will necessarily continue to be insufficient to provide all the critical information required in these areas. In

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~
IAC-D-29/7
27 March 1952

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Security Information

TOP SECRET

Security Information

IAC-D-29/7

27 March 1952

order to make the maximum use of these capabilities, intelligence agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means, giving proper attention to priorities.

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5. While the quality of national and departmental intelligence research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information collected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the research product. In this regard it is felt that the National Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There has been notable progress in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence and steps are being taken to improve coordination in other aspects of scientific and technical intelligence production. There is also under way a coordinated program for the systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR, and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counter-action by exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have continued

-4-

TOP SECRET

IAC-D-29/7

27 March 1952

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/11/24 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000200060025-2

Security Information

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TOP SECRET
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Security Information

IAC-D-29/7

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their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Orbit developments in order to detect any short-range warning of an intent to launch a military attack on the West.

6. Intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet their responsibilities in collection and research production. While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of the competition of other employers, both inside and outside the Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.

Related Activities

7. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the foreign or military policies of the Government can be expected to require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. It is expected that increasing reliance on Armed Service personnel will be required.

-5-

TOP SECRET

IAC-D-29/7

27 March 1952

Approved For Release 2005/11/24 : CIA-RDP82-00400R000200060025-2

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